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ABSTRACT
For my senior project, T chose to do an investigation on topside journal entries. Topside
journal entries are adjusting entries made by a parent company to the books of its subsidiaries when
preparing consolidated financial statements. Topside journal entries are a normal and necessary part
of accounting. For instance, topside journal entries can be used to allocate income or expenses from a
parent company to its subsidiaries. Such practice falls within the scope ofGAAP. Due to their
relative ease of concealment, however, topside journal entries have often been used to perpetrate fraud
as well by increasing revenues and decreasing expenses with no valid basis under GAAP. Topside
journal entries are most frequently used in fraud when management is under high pressure to conform
its financial statements to earnings expectations. Fraudulent misuse of topside journal entries is also
common in companies undergoing mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring.
Cendant Corporation and Symbol Technologies, Inc. are two companies whose managers
were guilty of using topside journal entries fraudulently to boost financial statement information.
While the specific methods offraud were slightly different, the underlying motives and strategies for
committing the respective frauds were striking similar. AU 316 states that three conditions must exist
in order for fraud to occur: 1) Management is under pressure or has an incentive to commit fraud, 2)
An opportunity to perpetrate fraud exists, and 3) Perpetrators can rationalize committing fraud. All
three conditions were present in the two aforementioned cases.
While the fraudulent misuse of topside journal entries might not seem like fraud to some at
first impression, it is important to realize that reclassifying real expenses (which are costs incurred to
earn past revenues) to assets (which have future value and should generate future revenues) misleads
readers of financial statements and is illegal. Such activity promotes a false sense of security among
investors and leads to inflated valuation for companies. Furthermore, creating false receivables or
booking false transactions is illegal for obvious reasons. Therefore, when examined closely, it is easy
to see how such misuse of topside journal entries can result in substantial acts of fraud.

USING TOPSIDE JOURNAL ENTRIES TO CONCEAL FRAUD
In light of recent fraud cases that have plagued business, managers have been
forced to realize the importance of the auditing profession now more than ever. In turn,
auditors have been forced to reexamine their own profession in order to ensure that their
services adequately comply with the needs of their clients. With the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers and auditors alike have been required to change several
procedures in their respective professions. Aside from legal decrees, however,
understanding past occurrences of fraud and recognizing them in the future is now of
utmost importance to auditors.
An alarming phenomenon in accounting in recent years has been the misuse of

topside journal entries to perpetrate fraud . Perhaps even more alarming is the failure of
the auditing profession as a whole to adequately address this issue. Topside journal
entries are adjusting entries made by a parent company to the accounting records of its
subsidiaries when preparing consolidated fmancial statements. Managers can
legitimately use topside journal entries for such tasks as allocating expenses (e.g.
technology cost, interest expense) and income (e.g. sales, miscellaneous income) from a
parent company to its subsidiaries. Such journal entries are normal entries in the course
of business and fall completely within the scope of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). Due to the relative ease of concealment, however, managers have
repeatedly used topside journal entries to perpetrate extensive frauds.

AU 316
AU 316 states that three conditions must exist in order for fraud to occur: 1)
Management is under pressure or has an incentive to commit fraud, 2) An opportunity to

perpetrate fraud exists, and 3) Perpetrators can rationalize committing fraud. Recently,
managers at two separate companies, Cendant Corporation and Symbol Technologies,
Inc., were under intense pressure to ensure that quarterly financial results met Wall Street
analysts' expectations. As a result of such burdens, managers at these companies were
able to rationalize committing frauds in order to achieve the desired outcomes on their
respective financial statements. Managers at both Cendant and Symbol fraudulently
misused topside journal entries to inflate financial statement infonnation. Thus, the cases
of Cendant and Symbol provide prime examples of how managers can use topside journal
entries to engage in substantial acts of fraud.

FRAUD AT CENDANT CORPORATION
Cendant merged with another company in December 1997. Before the merger,
Cendant had established a merger reserve to account for anticipated costs related to the
upcoming merger. Managers at Cendant used the pooling-of-interests method of
accounting to establish the merger reserve and to account for the merger in 1997. This
method of accounting, pennitted by GAAP at the time, consists of recording certain
anticipated costs as liabilities prior to actually incurring these costs. In the case of
Cendant, managers did use the merger reserve to record future liabilities related to the
merger, but they frequently manipulated this accoWlt through the misuse of topside
journal entries. Furthennore, managers used another reserve account, the membership
cancellation reserve, in a similar manner to carry out their fraudulent activities.
The fraud took place from the years 1995 through 1997. As is the trend with most
frauds, managers at Cendant were continually forced to make larger topside adjustments
as time progressed in order to inflate annual earnings to expected levels. By the time the
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fraud was discovered and Cendant was forced to make a public announcement
concerning the fraud, managers at Cendant had overstated the company's operating
income for the three-year period by hundreds of millions of dollars.
The problem occurred when managers at Cendant began to routinely overstate
restructuring charges in order to increase the merger reserve. Managers also frequently
increased the merger reserve by writing off assets they characterized as impaired (as a
result ofthe merger) when, in reality, most of these assets were not impaired. Managers
would then use the merger reserve to offset normal operating expenses, a process not
acceptable under GAAP. In essence, Cendant created its merger reserve with the intent
to use the account not only to record anticipated costs related to the merger, but to
fraudulently offset operating expenses unrelated to the merger as well. Using topside
journal entries to accomplish this scheme, managers at Cendant were able to improperly
manage earnings during the three-year period and had intentions to continue their actions.
The auditors of Cendant were also unwise in certain actions of their own
regarding management's misuse of the merger reserve. For instance, auditors provided
accounting advice to Cendant's managers concerning costs that are typical in corporate
restructurings. Unfortunately, such costs are often subjective in nature and difficult to
test. These costs require auditors to rely more heavily on managers' representations than
on specific audit evidence. Managers at Cendant were able to use the subjective nature of
these costs to conceal various expenses through the misuse of topside journal entries.
Auditors also failed to recognize various other actions of management that did not
conform to GAAP. For instance, managers provided the auditors ofCendant with
contradictory drafts of schedules when the auditors requested support for the
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establishment of the merger reserve. Managers continually revised these schedules to
satisfy the auditors' questions or to incorporate new information discovered by the
auditors. The schedules, however, were inconsistent with regard to the nature and
amount of the individual components of the reserve. Auditors repeatedly relied on these
ever-changing representations of management, in part due to the aforementioned
subjectivity, and therefore were unable to detect the fraud.
Managers at Cendant manipulated another reserve account, the membership
cancellation reserve, to inflate earnings as well. Managers created the membership
cancellation reserve to account for members who canceled during their membership
periods (and were therefore entitled to refunds) as well as members who were billed for
memberships but never paid for them (essentially, bad debts). When members paid for
their memberships, typically with credit cards, managers at Cendant would record an
increase in both the revenue and cash accounts at the time the credit cards were charged.
Issuers of members' credit cards would frequently reject these charges, however, on a
monthly basis. Therefore, Cendant would not receive the rejected charges as payments.
When confronted by auditors on this issue, managers falsely claimed that once
they resubmitted these rejections to banks, Cendant would ultimately collect nearly all
rejections within a three-month period. Furthermore, managers falsely claimed that they
recorded a reduction in the cash account and a decrease to the membership cancellation
reserve for each of the few uncollected rejections. At the end of each accounting period
during the course of the fraud, however, managers failed to record three months of
rejections. In other words, managers neither reduced the cash account nor decreased the
membership cancellation reserve for the corresponding amounts of the rejections.
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Managers at Cendant errantly reasoned that they did not need to record rejections that
occurred during the final three months of the year because they would collect most of the
rejections within a three-month period of the initial rejection.
The three months of withheld rejections created a temporary difference at the end
of the year between the cash balance reflected on Cendant's general ledger and the cash
balance reported on its bank statements. Managers falsely claimed that the difference
between the general ledger balance and the bank statement balance did not reflect an
overstatement of the cash account nor an understatement in the membership cancellation
reserve since most rejections would eventually be collected. In reality, however, Cendant
never collected the majority of the rejections. By not recording these rejections during
the final three months of the year, managers at Cendant drastically understated the
membership cancellation reserve and overstated the cash balance. Therefore, managers
were able to avoid the expense charges and journal entries necessary to rectify the
membership cancellation reserve and cash accounts. As was the case with the merger
reserve, auditors of Cendant relied primarily on managers' representations with respect to
the membership cancellation reserve and the company's "successful" collection history.

FRAUD AT SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Unfortunately, Cendant is not the only company whose managers have been
guilty of misusing topside journal entries to perpetrate a sizeable fraud. Managers at
Symbol Technologies, Inc. also used topside journal entries to perpetrate fraud, and the
similarities between what occurred at Cendant and Symbol are striking. From 19982002, managers at Symbol perpetrated a fraud that inflated the reported fmancial results
of their company. Managers manipulated reserves and made various improper topside
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adjustments to ensure that the financial data of Symbol complied with market
expectations.
Managers made dozens of topside journal entries to the accounting records of
Symbol that boosted net income and various other financial data by tens of millions of
dollars. Throughout the duration of the fraud, managers at Symbol prepared what they
called tango sheets. Tango sheets were schedules that compared the results of each
quarter to market expectations. Included in the tango sheets were proposed topside
adjustments to reserves and various other accounts that would better reflect market
expectations. Such topside adjustments lacked valid support and were in gross violation
of GAAP. When making the topside journal entries required to create such improper
adjustments, managers knew that the results were already inflated due to fraudulent
revenue recognition and other similar misconduct. Clearly, the misuse of topside journal
entries played a substantial role in the perpetration of this fraud.
Throughout the course of the fraud, managers at Symbol met in closing meetings
during which they reviewed each division's results within the company. At the
conclusion of these meetings, managers prepared consolidated financial statements
consisting of the raw results obtained by the company. Managers then proposed specific
topside journal entries based on the accounting "risks and opportunities" presented each
quarter. After discussing the necessary topside journal entries, managers posted the
entries to the general ledger without public disclosure. As a result of these topside
journal entries, managers at Symbol understated expenses and overstated revenues and
earrungs.
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Symbol was a company that was driven by its financial nwnbers, particularly
during the course of the fraud . The primary responsibility of managers was to ensure that
the company's financial data met market expectations. Therefore, based on AU 316, the
occurrence of fraud at Symbol is not surprising. Managers' response to these pressures
was to create a fraudulent scheme that would create the illusion that Symbol had met or
exceeded all market expectations. This scheme resulted in nwnerous misstatements of
vital financial infonnation and consisted of blatant disregard for the policies outlined in
GAAP.
Similar to Cendant, reserves (often tenned "cookie jar" reserves by managers at
Symbol), coupled with fraudulent misuse oftopside journal entries, were of central
importance to the perpetration of this fraud. Symbol maintained a credit memo reserve to
account for product returns from customers. Increases to this reserve decreased revenues
by the corresponding amounts. When calculating this reserve, however, managers at
Symbol did not do so in accordance with GAAP. Instead, managers set the reserve at a
desirable level to achieve specific revenue targets. In effect, managers increased the
reserve in increments lower than those required by GAAP, which in turn led to a material
misstatement of revenues for the related accounting periods.
When making increases to the credit memo reserve, managers simultaneously
created a negative effect on both the cost of goods sold and inventory accounts, which in
turn decreased gross profit. To lessen the effect such increases had on gross profit,
managers at Symbol made additional fraudulent topside journal entries to the credit
memo reserve that left the reported revenues unchanged while still improving the
reported gross profit. Such adjustments were unfounded in GAAP and were made by
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managers solely to present the appearance that Symbol had achieved the gross profit
expected by the market.
Managers at Symbol also created an excessive reserve for obsolete inventory in a
gross inventory account maintained by the company's operations division. This "cookie
jar" reserve was designed to account for obsolete inventory, but in reality it was used to
help the operations division meet quarterly expectations. The reserve was beyond any
reasonable estimate of the company's exposure for obsolete inventory, and managers at
Symbol made topside journal entries to this account in order to significantly distort
reported earnings.
Symbol also offered a retirement plan to its senior executives and made annual
contributions to the plan. In accordance with GAAP, Symbol created a reserve to
account for the expenses associated with the annual contributions. During the time
period in which the fraud occurred, some senior executives elected not to receive these
benefits in lieu of other benefits offered by the company. Therefore, Symbol was no
longer obligated to make annual contributions to the retirement plan for the benefit of
those senior executives who had opted out of the plan. Even more importantly, Symbol
was no longer obligated to pay retirement benefits to these senior executives.
With these obligations erased, Symbol was left with millions of dollars in excess
in the retirement plan reserve. Under such circumstances, GAAP requires managers to
establish a schedule for the periodic release of these reserves into earnings. Managers at
Symbol, however, chose to fraudulently use topside journal entries to release the
unneeded funds in the retirement plan reserve during quarters where the raw financial
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results fell short of market expectations. Doing so allowed managers to fraudulently
boost earnings when needed, again without proper disclosure.
One year during the course of the fraud, Symbol paid bonuses to its employees for
work completed in the previous year. As a result, Symbol was obligated to pay the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) insurance during the quarter in which the
bonuses were paid. GAAP requires the recognition of this expense in the quarter in
which it is incurred. Managers at Symbol, however, chose to make topside adjustments
that deferred the FICA insurance expense to a later accounting period in order to boost
net income during the quarter in which the expense was incurred.
At the end of the same year, Symbol owed and needed to account for more
ordinary performance bonuses, as well as some nonrecurring bonuses related to a
corporate acquisition. According to GAAP, ordinary performance bonuses are classified
as operating expenses to be recognized in the quarter in which they are incurred. To
reduce this adverse impact on operating expenses, managers at Symbol made improper
topside journal entries to reclassify some of the ordinary performance bonuses.
Managers reclassified the ordinary performance bonuses as nonrecurring bonuses related
to the corporate acquisition, which are excluded from operating expenses. Such actions
significantly jnflated net earnings for the related quarter.
Finally, in order to manipulate the gross profit margin that managers reported for
the related year, managers at Symbol reclassified numerous expenses from cost of goods
sold to operating expenses through the misuse of topside journal entries. Such actions
artificially boosted gross profit margin and enabled managers at Symbol to conceal that a
recent drop in prices had eroded sales profits.

9

PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
As is evident in the two cases involving Cendant and Symbol, the fraudulent
misuse of topside journal entries has been an alarming trend in recent years. This trend
raises questions concerning the ability of auditors to detect such fraudulent activity. In
the cases of Cendant and Symbol, very weak internal controls were in place. Therefore,
auditors must ensure the existence and implementation of strong internal controls by
company management.
For instance, auditors should check for the existence of an internal audit
department and should communicate regularly with those associated with the internal
audit. Auditors should see that managers monitor and require authorization for all journal
entries as well. Journal entries should be adequately supported and should accurately
reflect the underlying events and transactions. Furthermore, auditors should familiarize
themselves with company procedural manuals and make certain that managers enforce
strict adherence to the procedures outlined in these manuals. Finally, auditors should
take into account the process by which an entity prepares its financial statements and
should ensure that proper controls are present in this process. Although collusion among
managers can impede auditors' ability to detect fraudulent misuse of topside journal
entries, management's failure to implement strong internal controls can often signal
fraudulent activity.
Aside from verifying that certain controls exist from management's perspective,
auditors should make sure that they demonstrate a high degree of professional skepticism
in their own work. They should design audits to closely examine irregular adjustments
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and journal entries, particularly topside journal entries that seem to have no basis in
GAAP (topside journal entries involving reserve accounts are frequent red flags).
Auditors should also compare revenues and expenses from previous accounting periods
and note any sizeable differences between amounts from period to period. When
selecting items to test, auditors should identify the population of journal entries and
adjustments that affect financial statements. Finally, auditors should be conscious of
management's expectations and be particularly skeptical if managers are under intense
pressure to obtain lofty financial results.

REESTABLISHMENT OF PROFESSION
The accounting frauds of the last decade have damaged the reputation of what
was once a highly trusted profession. Managers now must realize the importance of
auditors in maintaining the credibility and reputation of their respective companies.
Auditors must also realize the importance of their responsibility to ensure the credibility
of both the clients they audit and the auditing profession itself. The fraudulent misuse of
topside journal entries has become a huge problem in recent years, and it demands the
attention of both managers and auditors alike. Although not all topside journal entries are
fraudulent, managers, and particularly auditors, should be keenly aware of all topside
journal entries and examine them closely. By paying closer attention to the use oftopside
journal entries, both managers and auditors can contribute to the reestablishment of
character and trust that was once prevalent in the accounting profession.
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